American Indian Law Review
Volume 41

Number 2

2017

Yellowbear v. Lampert— Putting Teeth into the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Person Act of 2000
Nathan Lobaugh

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Nathan Lobaugh, Yellowbear v. Lampert— Putting Teeth into the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Person Act of 2000, 41 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 467 (2017),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol41/iss2/9

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma
College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact Law-LibraryDigitalCommons@ou.edu.

NOTE
YELLOWBEAR V. LAMPERT— PUTTING TEETH INTO
THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED
PERSON ACT OF 2000
Nathan Lobaugh*
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA) provides prisoners with a means to challenge prison policies that
impede their right to freely exercise their religion. Although the RLUIPA
provides a means by which to challenge restrictive prison policies,
prisoners seeking to establish a claim under the RLUIPA often face an
uphill battle. The difficulties a prisoner faces when bringing a RLUIPA
claim compound when that prisoner belongs to a religion that is not widely
practiced in the United States.1 This note analyzes the implications that
Yellowbear v. Lampert has on the manner in which Native American
prisoners’ rights will be viewed and adjudicated going forward.2
Andrew J. Yellowbear is a member of the Northern Arapaho tribe. He is
also a prisoner of the Wyoming Department of Corrections. While serving
his sentence, Yellowbear finds solace in the traditional religion of his
ancestors. Central to Yellowbear’s religious beliefs is the sweat lodge
ceremony.3 Through the use of a sweat lodge, Yellowbear seeks to purify
his mind, spirit, and body in the same manner that his ancestors have since
time immemorial.4 Yellowbear, however, was denied his right to exercise
this aspect of his religion by the Wyoming Corrections Department.5 This
deprivation prompted him to file a claim against the Corrections

*
1.
2.
3.

Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 54 (10th Cir. 2014).
741 F.3d 48.
FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CPD T5360.01, INMATE RELIGIOUS
BELIEFS AND PRACTICES at Native American, 1 (Mar. 27, 2002), http://www.acfsa.org/
documents/dietsReligious/FederalGuidelinesInmateReligiousBeliefsandPractices032702.pdf
[hereinafter INMATE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND PRACTICES] (“Sweat lodge ceremonies are
generally conducted on a weekly basis in a correctional setting. If the Native American
population is rather large, two separate sweat lodge ceremonies may be conducted on a
weekly basis to accommodate all participants.”).
4. Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 56.
5. Id. at 52.
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Department under the RLUIPA, seeking to gain limited access to a sweat
lodge that already exists within the prison walls.6
This note takes the position that Yellowbear v. Lampert has favorable
implications for Native American prisoners who wish to bring a claim
under the RLUIPA. These favorable implications consist primarily of
making courts assess the burdens under the RLUIPA that the government
and the claimant must meet, at the same level of generality. Part I will
examine the portions of the RLUIPA that pertain to institutionalized
persons, with a focus on the burdens that a claimant must meet to establish
a prima facie claim, and the burdens that the government must overcome to
defeat that claim. Part II will contain a statement of the case. Part III will
briefly summarize the decision of the case. Finally, Part IV will provide an
analysis of the arguments utilized by the court in reaching its decision. Part
IV will also emphasize the positive implications that Yellowbear represents
for Native American religious practitioners bringing a claim under the
RLUIPA.
I. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 20007 is a
landmark piece of legislation as evidenced by its far reaching support. By
passing the RLUIPA, Congress provides citizens with the means to
challenge governmental policies that substantially burden their right to
freely exercise their religion, as well as the means to challenge
governmental actions that affect the use of land that is religiously
significant to a particular group.8 As such, the RLUIPA is based on the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.9 The
RLUIPA was passed by a unanimous Congress.10 Such bipartisan support is
very rare, and evidences the importance that the RLUIPA embodies. Both
political parties agreed that it is vitally important to protect our religious
freedom to the utmost extent. Further evidence that the RLUIPA constitutes
a significant statute is the fact that it was upheld in a unanimous Supreme
Court ruling in Cutter v. Wilkinson, a case challenging the RLUIPA under
the Establishment Clause.11
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2012).
See generally id.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 53 (10th Cir. 2014).
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 (2005).
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This note will focus on the portions of the RLUIPA pertaining to the
religious freedom of institutionalized persons.12 According to the relevant
portion of the RLUIPA:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an
institution, as defined in section 1997 of this title, even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the
government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that
person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.13
This portion of the RLUIPA is best understood in terms of the burdens that
a claimant must meet in order to establish a claim, and the burdens that the
government must overcome in order to defeat that claim.
A. The Claimant’s Burdens Under the RLUIPA
As Judge Gorsuch (now Justice Gorsuch) noted in Yellowbear, the
RLUIPA is a statute “capable of mowing down inconsistent laws, but to
win its application takes no small effort.”14 The burdens that a claimant
must meet under the RLUIPA are twofold. First, a claimant must establish
that the prison policy being challenged burdens a religious exercise.15
Second, the claimant must establish that the prison policy constitutes a
substantial burden on that religious exercise.16
Regarding the first burden, the RLUIPA does not protect against every
governmental action that intrudes upon a prisoner’s acts of “philosophical
conviction” or “personal conscience.”17 Rather, it protects only actions
motivated by religious beliefs. Important to the question of what constitutes
a religious exercise, is the concept of sincerity.
The sincerity component of the “religiosity” requirement of the RLUIPA
is quite often dispositive of the overall success of the claim. The sincerity
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.
Id.
Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 53.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
Id.
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requirement is intended to weed out those claimants who wish to receive
some special treatment under the guise of religious beliefs. The
determination of what is a sincere religious belief, however, is limited by
the non-religious role of the court with the acknowledgment that judicial
officers are not well trained in deciding what is a sincere religious belief
verses one that is insincere.18
The difficulty in determining what is a sincere religious belief is
compounded when the court is asked to rule on the sincerity of a belief that
is part of a religious tradition that is not widely understood—for example,
Native American religious traditions.19 To reduce the problems inherent in
determining sincerity, the court essentially asks whether the claimant is
attempting to perpetrate fraud on the court.20 This determination is similar
to the credibility assessments that courts frequently make.
Upon a showing of sincerity, a claimant under the RLUIPA must also
show that the governmental policy in question burdens the exercise of their
religious beliefs.21 As the Supreme Court noted in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, “the ‘exercise of
religion’ often involves not only belief and profession but the performance
of (or abstention from) physical acts: assembling with others for a worship
service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing,
[and/or] abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of transportation.”22
Thus, the claimant must show that the governmental policy challenged goes
beyond merely infringing upon their beliefs to the point of infringing upon
the exercise of their religion.
A claimant under the RLUIPA does not need to show that the religious
exercise being infringed is a “central,” a “fundamental,” or a “compelled”
tenant of that religion.23 When passing the RLUIPA, Congress seemingly
determined that it would run the risks of too many mistakes to require the
18. Id. at 54.
19. Id.
20. Id. (“When inquiring into a claimant's sincerity, then, our task is instead a more
modest one, limited to asking whether the claimant is (in essence) seeking to perpetrate a
fraud on the court—whether he actually holds the beliefs he claims to hold—a
comparatively familiar task for secular courts that are regularly called on to make credibility
assessments—and an important task, too, for ensuring the integrity of any judicial
proceeding.”).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2012).
22. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990),
overturned due to statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb4 (2012).
23. Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 54.
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courts to parse what is a central tenant of a religious tradition.24 Thus, even
if the religious exercise in question is not considered by all adherents of a
religion as “central,” a religious claimant may still sustain a case under the
RLUIPA.25
As stated, the second burden that a claimant must meet is that the prison
policy in question substantially burdens that religious exercise.26 The
analysis of whether a prison policy substantially burdens a religious
exercise is distinct from the religious exercise analysis itself. Under this
requirement, a claimant must plead enough facts to allow a reasonable trier
of fact to conclude the truth of these claims in order to sustain a prima facie
case under the RLUIPA. It is important to note that this is not an inquiry
into the merit or importance of the claimant’s beliefs. Rather, “the inquiry
focuses only on the coercive impact of the government's actions.”27
The Tenth Circuit has noted that a state’s policy rises to the level of
being substantial when:
[T]he government (1) requires the plaintiff to participate in an
activity prohibited by a sincerely held religious belief, (2)
prevents the plaintiff from participating in an activity motivated
by a sincerely held religious belief, or (3) places considerable
pressure on the plaintiff to violate a sincerely held religious
belief—for example, by presenting an illusory or Hobson's
choice where the only realistically possible course of action
available to the plaintiff trenches on sincere religious exercise.28
It is worth noting that for a burden to be substantial, it does not need to
be a complete or total denial of that religious exercise. Upon a showing of
these two burdens, a claimant has established a prima facie claim under the
RLUIPA.
B. The Government’s Burdens Under the RLUIPA
Once a claimant has established a prima facie case under the RLUIPA,
the government must also meet two burdens in order to overcome that
claim. First, the prison policy being challenged must be “in furtherance of a

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 55.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 55.
Id. (citing Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 2010)).
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compelling governmental interest.”29 Second, the prison policy must be “the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest.”30
The Supreme Court has thus far declined to give a bright line definition
of what constitutes a compelling interest in the context of a RLUIPA claim.
The interests asserted by prison officials are almost always staff and inmate
safety and security, as well as the avoidance of costs.31 These two interests
are related in that a prison generally must spend more money in order to
increase the level of security within the prison. Typically, courts will find
prison security to be a compelling interest, and there also seems to be a
trend toward accepting the avoidance of cost as a compelling interest.32
At the outset of the compelling interest analysis, it is important to note
that while the language of the RLUIPA is identical to a traditional
formulation of the strict scrutiny level of review, this portion of the
RLUIPA takes on a somewhat different character given that such claims
arise in the unique context of a prison.33 In the leading Supreme Court case
for the portions of the RLUIPA pertaining to prisons, the Court heavily
emphasized that “context matters.”34 The interests that guide governmental
decision making in the context of a prison are much different than those
interests that guide such decision making in society as a whole. For
example, security for both the inmates and the prison staff are of vital
importance in the context of a prison. A prison must also operate on a
limited budget. Further, balancing the need for safety and the need to
operate with limited resources in a prison requires experience and expertise
that the general population lacks, judges included. Given these unique
circumstances, courts typically provide more deference to prison officials’

29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.
30. Id.
31. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005); Aaron K. Block, Note, When
Money Is Tight, Is Strict Scrutiny Loose?: Cost Sensitivity as a Compelling Governmental
Interest Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 14 TEX. J.
C.L. & C.R. 237, 245 (2009) (“In the prison context, both Congress and the courts consider
inmate and staff safety and institutional security to be the most compelling governmental
interests.”).
32. Block, supra note 31, at 245-46.
33. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 864 (2015) (“Prison officials are experts in running
prisons and evaluating the likely effects of altering prison rules, and courts should respect
that expertise.”).
34. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 723 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003)).
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asserted compelling interests than they would in a traditional strict scrutiny
analysis.35
Upon a showing of a compelling interest, the government must
demonstrate that the policy is “the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling interest.”36 The Supreme Court has recognized that within the
context of a prison, more deference must be given to prison officials’
experience and expertise.37 The legislative history of the RLUIPA also
demonstrates that the sponsors of the bill were very concerned with
providing prison officials with enough leeway to make the difficult
decisions surrounding prison security and the allocation of resources.38
Even though the language of the RLUIPA appears identical to traditional
strict scrutiny, the burdens that the government must meet are much less
severe than they would be under the traditional strict scrutiny test. While
the “least restrictive means” prong of the RLUIPA test is less severe than
traditional strict scrutiny analysis, the government still must show that it has
refuted alternative policies suggested by the claimant.39 This requires prison
officials to consider alternatives suggested by the claimant, to specifically
refute them, and show why they are inadequate.40 If the government can
meet these burdens, then the claimant’s RLUIPA claim will be defeated.
II. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
Yellowbear is serving a sentence that will likely span for the remainder
of his life.41 During his confinement, he has turned to his religious beliefs
35. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 864; Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722 ("We do not read RLUIPA to
elevate accommodation of religious observances over an institution's need to maintain order
and safety. Our decisions indicate that an accommodation must be measured so that it does
not override other significant interests.”).
36. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 714-15 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515-16
(1997)); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).
37. Id. at 717.
38. S. REP. 103-111, at 10 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1900
(“Accordingly, the committee expects that the courts will continue the tradition of giving
due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in
establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and
discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.”).
39. Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 62-63 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v.
Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1289 (10th Cir. 2011)).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 51.
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for comfort. Yellowbear practices the traditional Native American religion
of the Northern Arapaho tribe. As part of this religious tradition,
Yellowbear requires access to a sweat lodge.42 In the Wyoming prison in
which Yellowbear is incarcerated, there already exists a working sweat
lodge that is frequently made available to Native American inmates. Prison
officials, however, denied Yellowbear access to the sweat lodge because he
is housed in the special protection unit of the prison.43
Yellowbear is housed in the special protection unit through no fault of
his own, but rather due to threats made against him by other inmates.44
Yellowbear brought a RLUIPA claim against prison officials seeking some
degree of access to the sweat lodge. The sweat lodge within the prison is
located in the general population area. The prison officials claim that the
cost of moving Yellowbear from the protective unit, where he is housed, to
general population would be unduly burdensome because it would require a
lock-down of certain portions of the prison.45
The district court that initially heard this case decided that the prison
policy did not violate the RLUIPA, and entered summary judgment in favor
of the prison.46 Yellowbear then appealed this decision to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Because the district court granted summary judgment,
Yellowbear only needed to plead enough facts to show that a reasonable
trier of fact could find in his favor.
B. Issue
The issue in this case can be stated in at least two ways, either from the
perspective of the claimant, or the government. First, from the perspective
of the claimant: whether Yellowbear has met the burdens required of a
claimant under the RLUIPA to a sufficient degree to allow a reasonable
trier of fact to infer the truth of the claim? Second, from the perspective of
the government: whether the state has responded to Yellowbear’s claims to
such a degree that no reasonable trier of fact could infer the truth of those
claims?

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

INMATE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND PRACTICES, supra note 3, at Native American, 1.
Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 53.
Id.
Id. at 53, 58-59.
Id. at 53.
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III. Decision in the Case
The Tenth Circuit held that factual issues precluded the court from
entering summary judgment in favor of the government.47 In other words,
the court ruled that Yellowbear succeeded in establishing a prima facie
claim under the RLUIPA, and as such, the case was remanded to the district
court so that it could proceed to trial.48 The Tenth Circuit also ruled that the
government did not establish the facts necessary to defeat Yellowbear’s
RLUIPA claim at the summary judgment stage.49 Thus, the court’s ruling
was favorable to Yellowbear.
IV. Analysis
As the Tenth Circuit in Yellowbear notes, the most important aspect of
this case, and cases like it, lies in the manner in which courts typically
weigh the substantial burden on a claimant’s exercise of religion against the
prison officials’ asserted compelling interests.50 Section A will discuss the
court’s analysis in Yellowbear of the problems associated with assessing
each parties’ burdens under the RLUIPA with differing levels of generality.
Section B will discuss the implications of Yellowbear for future Native
American RLUIPA claimants, which primarily consists of requiring courts
to assess each parties’ burdens under the RLUIPA with the same level of
generality.
A. The Tenth Circuit’s Analysis of Each Parties’ Burdens Under the
RLUIPA
In Yellowbear, the Tenth Circuit argues that one of the main problems
for RLUIPA claims is that courts often assess the burdens that the claimant
must meet and those that the government must meet with “different levels
of generality.”51 The court assesses the burdens that must be met for the
claimant in a very fact-intensive and specific manner, whereas the burdens
that must be met by the government are often analyzed in a very abstract
manner.52

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 64.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 57.
Id. (citation omitted).
See id.
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1. The Tenth Circuit’s Analysis of the Claimant’s Burdens Under the
RLUIPA
As discussed in Part I, in order for an inmate to establish a claim under
the RLUIPA, they must show that a (1) religious exercise is (2)
substantially burdened by a prison policy.53 In other words, an inmate must
plead enough facts to demonstrate that a governmental policy places a
substantial burden on a sincerely held religious exercise. The Tenth Circuit
has clearly stated that a burden on a religious exercise rises to the level of
being substantial when an inmate is prohibited from “participating in an
activity motivated by a sincerely held religious belief.”54
In this case, the Tenth Circuit has little difficulty in finding that
Yellowbear met the burdens required of claimants under the RLUIPA. In
part, this is because this case is essentially a summary judgment case, in
which the facts must be construed in a light most favorable to Yellowbear.
Yet, even given this procedural posture, the court was readily accepting of
Yellowbear’s argument that the prison officials’ decision to withhold access
to the pre-existing sweat lodge constituted a substantial burden to a
sincerely held religious exercise. At this point in the litigation, the
government did not dispute that the use of a sweat lodge was an important
aspect of many Native American religions.55 To bolster this fact, the Tenth
Circuit provides a number of sources that establish the centrality of the
sweat lodge ceremony within many Native American religions.56 The court
concludes that Yellowbear succeeded in pleading enough facts to allow a
reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the use of a sweat lodge is a sincere
religious exercise.
The Tenth Circuit also wastes little time in deciding that a reasonable
trier of fact could conclude that Yellowbear’s complete denial of access to a
sweat lodge rises to the level of a substantial burden on that religious
exercise.57 As the court puts it, the parties in this case contended on the
level of absolutes: Yellowbear desired some access to a sweat lodge, and
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2012).
54. Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 55.
55. Id. at 56.
56. INMATE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND PRACTICES, supra note 3, at Native American, 1;
see JOSEPH BRUCHAC, THE NATIVE AMERICAN SWEAT LODGE: HISTORY AND LEGENDS (1993);
ARLENE HIRSCHFELDER & PAULETTE MOLIN, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIVE AMERICAN
RELIGIONS 287–88 (1992); Louis M. Holscher, Sweat Lodges and Headbands: An
Introduction to the Rights of Native American Prisoners, 18 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 33 (1992).
57. Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 56.
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the prison officials denied him any access to a sweat lodge.58 The court
easily concludes that by completely withholding, or prohibiting,
Yellowbear’s access to a sweat lodge, the government has placed a
substantial burden on that religious exercise.59 Thus having decided that
Yellowbear had demonstrated these two burdens, thereby establishing a
prima facie RLUIPA claim, the court turned to analyzing the burdens that
must be demonstrated by the government in order to prevail at summary
judgment.
2. The Tenth Circuit’s Analysis of the Government’s Burdens Under the
RLUIPA
Even if a claimant has met the requisite burdens to establish a prima
facie RLUIPA claim, the government may still prevail if it can show that
the challenged policy is the least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling governmental interest.60 In contrast to the court’s reception of
the claimant’s burdens, the Tenth Circuit is hesitant to find that the
government has met the burdens necessary to defeat Yellowbear’s RLUIPA
claim at summary judgment.61
The compelling interests asserted by the government in this case are
security and the avoidance of costs.62 This is unsurprising given that these
are the most commonly asserted governmental interests in RLUIPA
litigation. The Tenth Circuit proceeds to unpack these more generally
asserted interests, and finds three potentially compelling interests. First, the
government asserts that the use of sweat lodges is inherently dangerous,
because it involves the use of hot coals.63 Second, the government asserts
that allowing Yellowbear access to the preexisting sweat lodge would be
unduly financially burdensome since it would require a lock-down of
portions of the prison in order to move him to the location of the sweat
lodge.64 Third, the government asserts that if it were to grant Yellowbear’s
request it would be flooded with similar requests from other inmates.65 The
court addresses each of these potential compelling interests, but finds each
of them lacking.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2012).
Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 57.
Id. at 57-59.
Id. at 57-58.
Id. at 58-59.
Id. at 62.
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The government begins by asserting that the prison officials have a
compelling interest in denying Yellowbear access to the sweat lodge
because sweat lodges in general are inherently dangerous, given that they
require the use of hot coals.66 In an attempt to support this argument, the
government cites cases from other circuit courts that were decided against
inmates seeking access to sweat lodges on the basis of their inherent
danger.67 In those cases, the courts were willing to accept, almost
unconditionally, that security always constitutes a compelling interest in the
context of the RLUIPA.68 The Tenth Circuit was unreceptive to this
argument because, rather than plead specific facts to establish that a sweat
lodge would be dangerous in the context of this particular case, the
government attempted to rely upon general abstractions concerning the
inherent dangers of allowing inmates access to a sweat lodge.69 The Tenth
Circuit points out that such an argument is undercut by the fact that the
prison in question already has an operating sweat lodge on the premises.
The court poses the question that if the use of a sweat lodge within a prison
is inherently dangerous to the point that it constitutes a compelling interest
sufficient to deny an inmate access to it, then how can the prison officials
justify the pre-existence of such a sweat lodge?70 The Tenth Circuit
disapprovingly refers to this potential compelling interest as a “post-hoc
rationalization” that is unsupported factually.71 Having decided that the
broad statement that sweat lodges are inherently dangerous does not
constitute a compelling interest, the court moves on to the next potential
compelling interest.
The government argues that it has a compelling interest in denying
Yellowbear access to the sweat lodge because allowing access would
require a lock-down of certain portions of the prison.72 Prison officials
claim that a lock-down would be necessary in order to ensure that
Yellowbear does not come into contact with other inmates who may harm
him, and that such a lock-down would be unduly financially burdensome. 73
66. Id. at 57-58.
67. Fowler v. Crawford, 534 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2008); Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563
(9th Cir. 1987).
68. Fowler, 534 F.3d at 939 (“A prison's interest in order and security is always
compelling.”).
69. Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 58.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 58-59.
73. Id.
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Once again, the court takes exception to this argument because the
government relies entirely on broad and general statements concerning cost,
and at no point pleads any facts to suggest that the cost of such a lock-down
would be too high.74 The Tenth Circuit drives home the point that RLUIPA
claims are context specific, and as such, for prison officials to prevail at
summary judgment, they must plead enough to show that in this particular
context the asserted interest is compelling.75 Even given the substantial
deference that is due to prison officials in RLUIPA cases, the Tenth Circuit
states that “the deference this court must extend to the experience and
expertise of prison administrators does not extend so far that prison officials
may declare a compelling governmental interest by fiat.”76 As the court
notes, to provide prison officials with this much deference would take
RLUIPA adjudication out of the realm of strict scrutiny and replace it with
no scrutiny at all.77 Due to the complete lack of context specificity in the
government’s argument, the court does not find cost to be a compelling
interest.
In its last attempt to show a compelling interest, the government argues
that if it accommodates Yellowbear’s request, then it will be flooded by
similar requests from other inmates.78 The Tenth Circuit once again takes
exception to the government’s reliance on such broad assertions.
Specifically, the court criticizes the government for not providing any
information to support the idea that there is a large number of specially
housed inmates awaiting such an opportunity to seek a religious
accommodation.79 The Tenth Circuit quotes the Supreme Court’s statement
of disapproval of such slippery slope arguments, saying that such
arguments “echo[] the classic rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout history: If
I make an exception for you, I'll have to make one for everybody, so no
exceptions.”80 The court reiterates the point that the RLUIPA is specific to
74. Id. at 59 (“[T]he prison does not even attempt to quantify the costs it faces, let alone
try to explain how these costs impinge on prison budgets or administration. Instead, the
prison simply asserts, flatly and without more, that the marginal costs are ‘unduly
burdensome.’”).
75. Id. at 58.
76. Id. at 59.
77. Id. at 59-60.
78. Id. at 62 (“As the prison puts it, Mr. Yellowbear's request ‘would be just the tip of
the iceberg.’ And avoiding a slippery slope down to submerged troubles just out of present
view, the prison suggests, amounts to a compelling interest all its own.”).
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418, 436 (2006)).
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the context of a particular claimant. Therefore, in order for the government
to prevail it must come forward with specific facts to support its asserted
compelling interests. Given that the government in this case did nothing
more than make a broad and unspecified slippery slope argument, the court
did not find a compelling interest in the government’s claims.81
B. Implications of Yellowbear for Future RLUIPA Claims Brought by
Native Americans
This case has positive benefits for Native American prisoners who might
wish to bring claims under the RLUIPA in the future. These benefits
primarily consist of requiring courts to assess the burdens of each party at
the same level of generality. Following Yellowbear, district courts within
the Tenth Circuit will be required to assess the government’s asserted
compelling interests against the burden on a particular claimant’s religious
exercise at the same level of generality. This is particularly important for
RLUIPA claimants who practice a religion that is not widely understood in
the United States, like Native American religions.
The importance of requiring prison officials to back-up their asserted
compelling interests with specific facts should not be understated.
Particularly, given the fact that in the prison context of the RLUIPA, prison
officials are provided much more deference than would normally be
afforded to them under a strict scrutiny analysis. Requiring courts to
analyze each of the parties’ burdens at the same level of generality is a
positive step toward achieving the original purpose of the RLUIPA: to
provide protection to inmates’ religious liberties by limiting prison
officials’ ability to curtail those freedoms. After the Supreme Court’s
statements concerning the heightened deference due to prison officials in
Cutter v. Wilkinson, many district and circuit courts began to allow prison
officials to broadly assert compelling interests, such as security and cost,
without providing a scintilla of concrete justification for their restrictive
policies.82
As interpreted by many lower courts, these statements concerning
deference to prison officials had the effect of taking the teeth out of the
strict scrutiny language in the RLUIPA. Given the Supreme Court’s
sanction to provide prison officials a broader degree of deference under the
RLUIPA than a typical strict scrutiny analysis, it is more important than
81. Id.
82. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005); see, e.g., Fowler v. Crawford, 534
F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2008); Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1987).
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ever that lower courts strike the delicate balance between following the
letter of the RLUIPA and still allowing prison officials the flexibility they
need to keep prisons secure and within their budgetary limitations. In
Yellowbear, Judge Gorsuch on behalf of the Tenth Circuit does a masterful
job of striking that balance. The court in Yellowbear follows the Supreme
Court’s mandate to provide more deference to the experience and expertise
of prison officials, while still abiding by the plain text of the RLUIPA.
Specifically, the Tenth Circuit repeatedly emphasizes that courts must
assess prison officials’ asserted compelling interest in the context of the
particular claimant.83 The deference required by the Supreme Court is not
so broad as to require courts to grant summary judgment to RLUIPA
defendants any time they claim a change in policy would result in less
security and more cost. Instead, a court may only grant summary judgment
to a RLUIPA defendant when they plead specific and detailed facts to
support their asserted compelling interests. Thus, in Yellowbear, the Tenth
Circuit provides due deference to the experience of prison officials while at
the same time living up to the purpose of the RLUIPA.
The implications of Yellowbear are evident in the recent Supreme Court
case Holt v. Hobbs. While the only direct reference to Yellowbear in that
case is found in Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor’s concurring opinion, the
influence of Yellowbear can be seen in the Supreme Court’s repeated
admonitions that lower courts must analyze prison official’s asserted
compelling interests in a highly context specific manner.84
V. Conclusion
Yellowbear v. Lampert is a favorable decision for Native American
prisoners seeking to file a claim under the RLUIPA. The benefits of this
decision rest primarily upon requiring courts to analyze the respective
burdens of the claimant and the government at the same level of generality.
There are certainly interesting questions pertaining to the RLUIPA left
unanswered in Yellowbear. For example, what would be the outcome if the
prison officials allowed Yellowbear access to a sweat lodge once a year
when his religion requires him to use a sweat lodge monthly? Would the
burden of Yellowbear’s religion be less substantial, and the prison officials’
interests more compelling? The Tenth Circuit anticipated these questions
but did not rule on them because the parties in this case contended on the
level of absolutes: some access to a sweat lodge, or no access to a sweat
83. Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 57.
84. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 867-68 (2015).
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lodge.85 In the future, however, such questions will certainly arise, and will
likely be analyzed similarly to the questions raised in this case.

85. Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 56.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol41/iss2/9

